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It is popularly believed that culture has a significant effect on economic performance 
(Buruna, 1999). Whilst some economic historians are sympathetic to this hypothesis 
(Landes, 1998), most economists are sceptical. They question the intellectual rigour of 
the underlying theory, and the objectivity of the evidence. In The Wealth of Nations, 
Adam Smith downgraded cultural factors from the prominent position they had 
occupied in his previous work, and subsequent economists have largely followed his 
lead (Macfie, 1967). Recently, however, theoretical interest in the economics of 
culture has revived (Olson, 2000). 
 
This chapter reviews attempts to bring greater rigour to the subject. It is argued that 
models of rational action, on which conventional neoclassical economics is based, can 
be extended to allow for cultural influences. Such models suggest that certain cultures 
promote economic performance better than others. 
 
Culture may be regarded as an economic asset – a form of cultural capital. It is an 
intangible public good, shared by the members of a social group. The analysis below 
identifies four major dimensions of culture which influence the performance of a 
group: 
?? individualism versus collectivism,  
?? pragmatism versus proceduralism,  
?? the degree of trust, and  
?? the level of tension. 
 
Individualism emphasises personal autonomy, and echoes Prime Minister Mrs. 
Thatcher’s dictum that ‘there is no such thing as society’, whilst collectivism asserts 
that it is natural for people to be socially embedded in a larger group. Pragmatism 
favours improvisation and flair in taking decisions, whilst proceduralism emphasises 
reliance on rules. High trust reflects a belief that other people are honest and hard-
working, whether they are supervised or not, whilst low-trust reflects a belief that 
people will take every profitable opportunity to shirk and cheat. The level of tension   3
reflects the level of achievement to which people aspire, and their determination to 
succeed. 
 
The analysis distinguishes between economic performance in a material sense, and 
overall quality of life. Quality of life depends on emotional as well as material 
rewards. Culture is not merely instrumental in the pursuit of material rewards, but is a 
direct source of emotional rewards as well. Boosting emotional rewards can also 
boost material rewards – as in highly-motivated teams – but there are trade-offs too: 
for example, a religion that encourages prayer and fasting may reduce material 
performance even though it improves quality of life. Bias in the measurement of the 
material living standards adds a further complication. A market economy may appear 
to out-perform a non-market economy in material terms simply because a higher 
proportion of its output is recorded in the national income statistics. 
 
It is relatively easy to show that culture can have a positive effect on quality of life. 
Quality of life depends heavy on the provision of intangible public goods, such as 
visual amenity, safety on the streets, and so on. Culture is not only a public good 
itself, but is instrumental in creating popular support for investment in other public 
goods. It is more challenging, however, to show that culture can improve the material 
output of private goods, and it is this challenge that is therefore the focus of attention 
in this chapter. Furthermore, since material performance is easier to measure than 
quality of life, hypotheses linking culture to material performance are, in principle, 
easier to test. 
 
Modern neoclassical economics implicitly endorses a Western culture of ‘competitive 
individualism’, which is individualistic and low trust. The collapse of Soviet 
communism, and the ‘triumph of the market’, was widely interpreted as 
demonstrating the advantages of an individualistic culture over a collectivist culture. 
It said nothing about the advantages or disadvantages of high trust, however. 
 
Until the 1970s, the justification for markets was seen mainly in their ability to adjust 
to incremental change. Globalisation, however, precipitated major changes, and led to 
the growth of ‘enterprise culture’, which emphasised the value of pragmatic 
improvisation over routine procedure when taking key decisions. At the same time,   4
Soviet communism remained wedded to procedural decision-making. Thus Western 
capitalism was not only individualistic but pragmatic, whilst Soviet communism was 
both collective and procedural. It is therefore unclear whether the superiority of 
individualism over collectivism, or pragmatism over proceduralism, was mainly 
responsible for the revealed superiority of the West. 
 
The success of many newly industrialising countries in pursuing state-led export 
programmes suggests that where government has been pragmatic rather than 
procedural it has sometimes been able to achieve remarkable results. It may therefore 
be that excessive reliance on procedure, rather than collectivism per se, caused the 
collapse of communism.  
 
Western capitalism and Soviet communism were both high-tension cultures, whilst 
developing countries, on the whole, exhibit low-tension cultures. In the third world, 
high-trust culture seems to perform better than low-trust culture (Sherman, 1997). 
Combining the lessons from these various comparisons therefore suggests that the 
most promising culture is individualistic, pragmatic, high-trust and high-tension. This 
is entrepreneurial associationism – a culture which encourages people to freely 
commit themselves to ambitious pragmatic team-based projects. It differs from 
competitive individualism in having a high level of trust. No country has been able to 
sustain associationism for very long, however, and so competitive individualism has 
emerged as a ‘second best’ solution. 
 
High tension stimulates competition, which tends to undermine trust. It is sometimes 
suggested that trust arises naturally, through repeated interaction, but it remains the 
case that selfish individuals have a strong incentive to cheat in the final play of any 
‘repeated game’. If trust is to prevail generally, it cannot be regarded as natural, but 
must be engineered (Casson, 1991). 
 
Trust is engineered by moral leadership, as explained below. From this perspective, 
lack of trust reflects a scarcity of leadership – indeed, there are grounds for believing 
that there is a systematic shortage of suitable leaders in most countries. An 
unfortunate legacy of inter-war Fascism is that the very concept of moral leadership 
has fallen into disrepute. This has discouraged the systematic production of moral   5
leaders through education. Families and local communities have under-invested in the 
supply of leaders for future generations. Furthermore, it is argued below that the 
growth of mass media has distorted competition between potential leaders to favour 
those who appeal to narrow self-interest. It is suggested that ineffective moral 
leadership has impaired the performance of Western economies over the last twenty 
years. Individualism and high-tension have been pursued to the point where they 
undermine trust, creating a consumer society marred by crime and anti-social 
behaviour. Undermining trust has raised the costs of coordination, eroded material 
performance, and caused serious detriment to quality of life. 
 
If this economic theory of culture is correct, and its diagnosis of events is sound, then 
the policy implication is that nations must improve the supply of moral leadership. 
Intellectual leaders such as priests, politicians philosophers and artists all have an 
important role to play in stimulating the imagination of political and business leaders, 
and so, in a successful society, such intellectual leaders will tend to embrace a high-
trust high-tension culture. 
 
The chapter is organised in four parts. The first part introduces basic concepts and 
definitions; the second part outlines an economic theory of culture, concerned with 
competition between groups; the third part discusses the key dimensions of culture, 
whilst the final part examines broader methodological and historical issues. 
 
Part One: Basic Concepts and Definitions 
 
The definition of culture: culture as a public good 
 
There are many important contemporary economic issues in which culture is a 
significant factor, such as 
?? Is a common European currency a symbol of political unification? 
?? Will contracting out public services such as health to private firms undermine 
the public service ethic? 
?? What exactly is ‘consumerism’? Do heavily advertised ‘lifestyle’ consumer 
brands delude consumers will false hopes, and does it matter if they do?   6
 
It is necessary to define culture in a way that captures the common elements in these 
questions. For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, culture is defined as shared 
values and beliefs relating to fundamental issues, together with the forms in which 
they are expressed. This suggests that there are three main aspects to culture: 
?? values, which represent the moral aspect of culture, 
?? beliefs, which represent the technical aspects, and 
?? forms of expression, which represent the symbolic and artistic aspects. 
These values, beliefs and forms of expression are shared within a social group. 
 
It can be seen that this approach to culture is more general than that employed in the 
economics of the arts. Arts tend to be identified with ‘high culture’, involving the 
expression of emotion through artefacts (e.g. paintings, books) and performances (e.g 
drama, ritual). Culture, as defined above, relates not only to emotional responses, but 
to quite detached views connected, for example, with scientific topics. Furthermore, it 
encompasses more than just expression – it includes the formation and dissemination 
of views as well. 
 
Culture is an intangible good. Cultural values and beliefs can be shared, which 
indicates that culture, like knowledge, has the property of a public good (Reisman, 
1990). The fact that one person holds certain beliefs, for example, does not preclude 
another person from holding these same beliefs too. Thus there is no rivalry in the 
consumption of culture. 
 
Culture may be a good because it has intrinsic value, or because it is instrumental 
towards some other purpose. People may value certain beliefs because holding these 
beliefs makes them happy (Layard, 1980; Easterlin, 1998, Chapter 10; 2001).  They 
may value other beliefs because they are purely instrumental – for example, for 
example, holding correct beliefs eliminates mistakes, and so reduces waste, and 
improves the material standard of living. It follows that culture can also be a ‘bad’. 
Some beliefs make people unhappy – for example, the belief that nobody likes them. 
Other beliefs may be damaging because they are wrong – mistakes are made when 
acting on these beliefs, and resources are wasted as a result. From an economic   7
perspective, therefore, the elimination of cultural bads is just as important as 




Cultural diversity is a topic which generates considerable controversy. Conventional 
economic theory suggests that culture is simply a set of beliefs which will ultimately 
converge on correct beliefs as a result of learning. There is a unique set of correct 
beliefs, on which everyone will eventually agree. Groups that refuse to learn will fail 
to survive. The only cultural guarantor of economic success is a correct economic 
theory, and the implementation of policies derived from it. 
 
Some economists seem to believe that convergence on the correct theory is almost 
instantaneous. Adherents of rational expectations theory, for example, maintain that 
everyone holds correct beliefs because they already know the true model of the 
economy (Lucas, 1981). Others allow the process of adjustment to take a little longer; 
they concede, for example, that the final collapse of authoritarian socialism in the 
1990s occurred only after a century of institutional experimentation. 
 
Simple economic models such as rational expectations, assume that information is 
costless to collect and communicate, and easy to verify. These assumptions about 
costless information are critical to the prediction that incorrect beliefs will be 
eliminated, and only correct beliefs survive. (The rational expectations approach to 
economics is a recent innovation which is very much at odds with traditional 
mainstream writing, even in the Chicago School – see, e.g. Leacock, 1998, and Viner, 
1972, 1978) 
 
Any plausible economic theory of culture must recognise the significance of 
information costs. Whilst knowledge is a public good, it is costly to share. No one has 
complete access to all available knowledge. Costs of collecting information mean that 
everyone bases their beliefs on only a limited amount of information. Optimal search 
theory shows that, once a certain amount of information has been collected, it is no 
longer cost-effective for an individual to refine their beliefs by collecting more. 
Beliefs are therefore based on a very limited amount of information. (Indeed, it is   8
interesting to note that recent research has introduced costs of rationality into rational 
expectations modelling, which has aligned the approach more closely with that set out 
in this chapter – see e.g. Ginsburgh and Michel, 1997) 
 
Access to information can be improved by pooling information, but this requires 
communication between people, which is costly too. It is often more efficient to leave 
someone to discover something for themselves rather than incur the costs of telling 
them about it. Information sources are typically localised, which means that when 
people rely upon their own resources, different groups of people, in different 
localities, have different sets of information.  Each group generates beliefs on 
fundamental issues by generalising from its own experience. This leads to different 
sets of beliefs, and so to cultural diversity. 
 
Cultural diversity is likely to diminish over time. Much information is a by-product of 
action – it is acquired through ‘learning by doing’ – and so accumulates over time. 
Additional information can be captured through scientific experiment. As a result, the 
information available to each group is likely to become more and more the same. 
Groups can also compare beliefs, and refine them through a process of criticism. In 
this way the accumulation of knowledge, combined with critical debate, encourages 
the emergence of consensus.  
 
Diversity cannot be eliminated, however, because of a lack of decisive information on 
certain crucial issues. Evidence is decisive when it convinces, not only believers, but 
also sceptics. Much of the evidence used in social science is difficult to replicate, 
because it cannot be collected under fully controlled conditions. It therefore lacks the 
‘objectivity’ that would convince a sceptic. Lack of objectivity is particularly 
problematic in the investigation of fundamental issues, such as the origin of 
consciousness, inequality of intelligence, and the relative importance of ‘nature’ and 
‘nurture’. Lack of objectivity allows people to remain attached to beliefs which 
explain their own experience but not the experiences of others. 
 
Disagreements are even more difficult to resolve in the field of values. Some value 
systems can be criticised for lack of consistency, although not everyone would accept 
that logical consistency is a requirement of a value system. Religious value systems   9
often appeal to revelation and sacred texts as a source of authority, but secular critics 
deny their validity. Diversity in values therefore tends to be not only greater, but also 
more enduring, than diversity in beliefs. (For further discussion of the influence of 
diversity in values see Baxter, 1988, Hahnel and Albert, 1990, and O’Brien, 1988) 
 
Overall, therefore, fundamental problems in assuring the quality of information mean 
that despite the increased quantity of information that flows within the world 
economy, cultural convergence on a true model is unlikely to be attained. The spread 
of the internet, for example, may well promote convergence on relatively superficial 
issues, such as the consumption of heavily advertised brands, but it is unlikely to 
promote convergence on more fundamental issues. Indeed, the proliferation of special 
issue lobbies, such as anti-globalisation protest groups, coordinated through the 
internet, suggests that increasing scepticism about the quality and integrity of 
‘official’ information is generating new sources of cultural diversity. Thus while 
cultural diversity in international consumption pasterns may be reduced through 
greater quantities of information flow, the limitations on information quality mean 




There is considerable popular awareness of differences between the cultures of 
particular groups of the same type. These differences are usually expressed in terms of 
stereotypes. A stereotype is an oversimplified characterisation of a social group, 
which ignores diversity within the group. It is a form of group reputation.  
 
The members of a group generally view their own group more favourably than do 
outsiders (which partly explains why they are happy to remain within the group). 
Indeed, competing groups often adopt negative stereotypes of each other, in order to 
justify their antagonism. For this reason stereotypes are often condemned for 
promoting distrust between groups. Different outside groups often hold rather similar 
views of any given group, however, which lends support to the idea that there is an 
objective kernel to the outsider’s view. Thus although stereotypes ignore internal 
diversity, and are often hostile, they are still useful because they usually contain   10
significant insights too (for the use of national stereotypes to analyse economic 
performance see Casson, 1990, Chapter 4). 
 
Culture as an asset 
 
Culture is a durable asset: values and beliefs are memorised by individuals, and are 
transmitted to the next generation through parenting and education. Education is 
strengthened when culture is recorded in books, embodied in art and artefacts, and 
embedded in rituals and routines. 
 
The durability of culture has encouraged some writers to see it as the ‘dead hand of 
the past’. Culture is acquired from early childhood, when people’s critical faculties 
are undeveloped. People become very attached to their early beliefs for emotional 
reasons –loyalty to parents, a concern for their ‘roots’, or fear of change. Beliefs are 
not revised in the light of new circumstances, and hence there develops a disjunction 
between culture and the real world. This view ignores the fact that people often 
review their beliefs in adolescence, or when they come of age. It also has the 
misleading implication that a very old culture is likely to be less appropriate than a 
newer one. 
 
An alternative view is that culture adapts to changing circumstances, but with a lag. It 
is sometimes suggested that a traumatic set-back, such as a military defeat, is 
necessary to undermine confidence in a culture. Defeated groups may sometime adopt 
their conqueror’s culture (or selected aspects of it). On this view, cultures which 
survive do so, not because of mere inertia, but because the beliefs they embody are 
more correct, or more successful, than those they replace. 
 
The most efficient way for a culture to cope with change is to adapt its beliefs in an 
incremental fashion, up-dating them in response to significant events and new 
discoveries. Monitoring the environment and up-dating beliefs is a complex task, 
however, and benefits from specialisation. It is impossible for everyone within a 
group to find the time to continually re-examine their beliefs for themselves. To 
understand how culture changes, therefore, it is necessary to understand the division 
of labour within social groups.   11
 
A typology of social groups 
 
The basic unit of cultural analysis is the social group: it is the unit within which 
culture is shared (Newman, 1983; Pryor, 1977). The most significant types of group, 
from a cultural perspective, are listed in Table 1. People are born into families and the 
local community where they live. They also acquire nationality at birth. When they 
come of age they can take decisions for themselves. They can choose the firm for 
which they work, the profession (if any) they wish to follow, and the clubs and 
societies they wish to join. They can also decide whether they wish to be active 
members of a church or a political party. In taking these decisions, they affirm certain 
values and beliefs they have acquired from family and friends, and reject others. 
 
In a high-tension society, belonging to a group involves significant commitments; 
furthermore, in a high-trust society there are significant emotional penalties for 
breaking such commitments –disloyalty and lack of perseverance bring guilt and 
shame. 
 
Within a group there are distinctive roles. Roles with greater responsibility generally 
carry higher status. High-status people can demand deference from other members of 
the group. In addition, there are differences in status between different groups. 
 
Some groups are task-oriented (like the firm) whilst others are support-oriented (like 
the family), although most types of group combine elements of the two. In a task-
oriented group the clients or customers, who consume the output, are usually different 
from the workers who produce the output, whereas in a support group the consumers 
and producers are often the same. In a charity for example, the donors who supply the 
funds are quite distinct from the beneficiaries, or clients, who receive them, whereas 
in a support group, like Alcoholics Anonymous, the members support each other 
(Bolnick, 1985). 
 
Clients usually have low attachment to a task-oriented group. Customers may have 
only casual contact with a firm, for example, whereas workers are heavily involved on 
a daily basis. Those who provide finance usually have less attachment than those who   12
provide labour. Shareholders in a large firm can easily sell out for speculative gain, 
whereas employees may serve for life; similar, donors to a charity are usually less 
involved than the volunteers. There are also differences amongst workers; whilst 
some may be permanent full-time staff, others may be casual part-time staff. In a 
high-trust society, commitment from workers and volunteers may be readily 
forthcoming, but in low-trust society people will prefer low-commitment involvement 
instead. People may prefer to give money rather than time to a charity, and to take 
only casual work, while shareholders may be very concerned that their holdings are 
liquid. 
 
Some groups have formal structures: these are typically large and long-lived groups. 
Formal structures institutionalise the division of labour, creating posts or offices to 
which people are appointed. Some posts may be filled on a rotating basis, often by 
election. Other groups are informal. A market consists of all the people who turn up in 
the market place to trade – whether the market is a physical location, a commercial 
publication, or a web-site. Although access to the market may be free, traders must 
abide by the rules for enforcing contracts. A network is even more informal – it is 
simply a group of people who are in regular contact with each other (Putnam, 1993). 
Networks are typically governed by customs, which are enforced through reputation 
effects. A low-trust culture requires formal rules and procedures, whereas a high-trust 
culture is more versatile: both formal and informal systems can be used. Networks are 
useful for sharing information, particularly between entrepreneurs. In a high-tension 
culture networks can foster innovation, but in a low-tension culture they may simply 
foster collusion instead. 
 
Part Two: Towards an Economic Theory of Culture 
 
Up to this point, the discussion has simply taken existing insights from sociology and 
social anthropology and reformulated them in economic terms. Further development 
of an economic approach to culture requires, however, specific analysis of 
competition between cultures, leading to an explanation of the competitive strategies 
employed by social groups. This section outlines a set of assumptions on which a 
formal model of cultural competition can be developed. 
   13
Leadership 
 
Leadership is the most important role within a group. The leader typically managers 
the external relations of a group. ‘Take me to your leader’ say outsiders who need to 
negotiate a commitment from a group. The leader demands loyalty from the members 
in order to guarantee the delivery of commitments, and to maintain the reputation of 
the group. The leader has the power to discipline or expel disloyal people. 
 
The logic of leadership is very simple. In a highly complex and uncertain world, 
people cannot resolve every issue for themselves. In particular, fundamental questions 
about the future of the world, and the destiny of the individual, cannot be easily 
answered. The costs of collecting and processing all the relevant information would 
be prohibitively high. Specialist leaders, such as priests and politicians, are required. 
Even then, their answers cannot be definitive. Different leaders give different answers 
to the same question, based on different information, and so different cultures prevail.  
 
Leaders also provide answers to more specific questions; thus the leader of a firm 
decides what type of product is most in demand, and the leader of a charity decides 
what kind of people are most in need of help. The leader is the person deemed to have 
a comparative advantage in processing the relevant information. He may also claim to 
have privileged access to information, perhaps through external contacts. 
Alternatively, he may claim to be able to interpret information in a better way 
(Casson, 2000). 
 
Leadership styles vary. Some charismatic leaders seek publicity, whereas others are 
self-effacing. Some leaders even seek to disguise their identity – such an agitator 
leading a demonstration, or the ‘brain’ at the centre of a spy-ring. The common notion 
that groups can achieve ‘spontaneous order’ without a leader is a myth. It is simply a 
consequence of failing to identify where leadership really lies. 
 
Leadership requires very scarce talents and, as a result, many leaders lack appropriate 
qualifications for the job. Successful leaders must justify the trust that their followers 
place in them. A leader who has lost the trust of his followers is of little value to the 
group. Members no longer feel secure in following his orders or advice. An   14
alternative leader may emerge ‘from the ranks’ of ordinary members, and constitute a 
rival source of authority - the militant British shop-steward, for example. The rival 
leader may organise to a revolution to depose the incumbent, if the incumbent cannot 
appoint a successor first. 
 
Competition between groups 
 
In a free society people can choose which leaders they follow. At any given time, 
rival leaders will disagree about fundamental issues, and people will have to decide 
with whom they agree. In particular, different political parties promote different 
ideologies, based on different theories of the economy and different views of human 
nature.  
 
In principle, only one of the rival leaders can be right. Indeed, the most likely scenario 
is that none of the leaders is right, since each is promoting an over-simplified, and 
somewhat distorted, view of the situation. Disagreements may persist because it is 
impossible to find any decisive evidence for or against a particular view. 
 
In practice, most leaders do not debate upon an abstract level, but rather in terms of 
strategy and policy. They promote specific projects, which embody the values they 
promote, and which, it is claimed, will work because the theory on which they are 
based is sound. A political leader may promote a project to create a Welfare State, 
based on the optimistic view that new technology makes ‘welfare for all’ an 
affordable proposition. A business leader motivates his workforce by claiming that his 
product is the best in the world, and a great benefit to all who consume it.  
 
An articulate leader offers his followers a vision of what the project can achieve. His 
rhetorical skill –in creating ‘sound bites’ and ‘buzz words’ - may be supported 
symbolically – perhaps by a launch at a prestigious location. The vision typically 
ignores the short run constraints under which the project operates, and emphasises its 
long run potential instead. 
 
A vision will often be deliberately vague. It may be expressed in an artistic form, 
which coveys an overall impression without revealing much key detail. The rationale   15
for this ambiguity lies in the fact that much can change before the project achieves its 
goal, so that it would be misleading to be too specific about the final outcome. Indeed, 
the more ambitious the project, the longer it is likely to take to complete, and so the 
vaguer the final outcome will be at the initial stage. 
 
Competition may also induce leaders to scorn their rival’s visions – arguing that they 
represent unworkable delusions. In Western democracies, debate between party 
leaders sometimes degenerates in mutual scorn. The emergence of negative 
stereotypes, promoted by leaders who wish to discourage their members from 
defecting to rival groups, can be explained in similar terms. This negative strategy has 
its limitations, however – too much emphasis on another leader’s faults may suggest 
to honest followers that a leader is simply distracting attention from his own defects 
instead. 
 
A key feature of a vision is that it arouses an emotional response in the follower. Such 
emotions are often described as ‘beauty’ (in the discovery of a simple theory, for 
example), ‘glory’ (as in winning a great team victory) or ‘awe’ (as in creating a 
monumental piece of architecture or engineering). The follower is enthused by 
contemplating the vision. By assessing their own emotional response to the vision, the 
follower can assess the magnitude of the emotional rewards that they will obtain 
through participation in the project. 
 
Participation in each project involves a contract – usually an implicit contract, assured 
through trust, but sometimes a formal contract too, which is backed by law. There is 
an important ‘psychological dimension’ to this contract. The leader emphasises that 
the reward obtained by contemplating the vision will be strongest for those who make 
the greatest effort. Each follower will know how much effort they have committed to 
the project. The greater the sacrifices they have made, the greater the rewards they 
will obtain. These rewards come from two main sources. The first is the satisfaction 
from being absorbed in a worthwhile project, to the point where the worker is 
unaware of his surroundings or of the passage of time. The second is a sense of pride 
and contentment when they rest from their work, and reflect, not only on what they 
have already achieved, but what will be achieved when the project is complete. 
Followers who know they have made little effort will experience little reward, whilst   16
those who have deliberately shirked will experience guilt, and wish that they had 
never joined. 
 
An effective leader will show appreciation of followers’ efforts. But the leader cannot 
always monitor individual effort with great accuracy. In certain types of work this 
‘agency problem’ may be overcome by basing rewards on measured output. But 
output may be only weakly correlated with individual effort, particularly in large 
teams. The ‘psychological contract’ is particularly valuable, therefore, in motivating 
effort in teams. 
 
Team-work is not just a matter of effort, however. Loyalty is important in any project, 
and particularly so in teams, where the loss of a member can be very disruptive. Every 
new member has to learn their role, and the cost of training usually falls on the leader. 
Loyalty is thus an important element in the ‘psychological contract’. The stronger a 
person’s emotional attachment to the project at the outset, the greater their sense of 
guilt when quitting. 
 
When an individual is deciding whether to follow a particular leader, therefore, they 
will need to know both how they are likely to respond to the vision, and how they will 
actually perform. They therefore need to know their own competencies and their own 
emotional characteristics too. If these characteristics are incorrectly assessed then a 
mis-match will occur between the individual and the project, and thus between the 
individual and the group. This will in turn lead to a waste of resources, in both 
material and emotional terms. 
 
It is typically assumed in economics that individuals possess full information on their 
own personal characteristics. In practice, however, it can be argued that they do not. 
In neoclassical economic theory, ‘asymmetric information’ is usually construed as 
meaning that an individual knows their own characteristics, but others do not. It is 
possible, however, to construe the concept differently, and to suppose that other 
people know a person’s characteristics better than they do themselves. Focusing on 
emotional characteristics highlights this point. Most parents have a better 
understanding of their children’s emotions than the children do themselves. Many 
people remain ‘child-like’ (or even ‘childish’) in their emotions when grown up, and   17
so not only family, but also friends, may be better aware of a person’s emotional 
characteristics than the person themselves. Indeed, using biological evidence, Frank 
(1985) has argued that people signal their own emotions to others unselfconsciously, 
through facial expression and posture, and that their inability to control these 
emotional signals gives a credibility to their statements that they would otherwise 
lack. In a similar vein, Freudian psychoanalysts have argued that people sublimate 
their emotions in order to disguise their feelings from themselves. People not merely 
lack self-knowledge and self-awareness – they are also systematically deny the 
existence of certain emotions too. 
 
It is unnecessary to accept all of these claims in order to agree that many followers 
may be unaware of their emotional characteristics at the time they take a decision to 
join a group. Joining a group is therefore not only risky because of uncertainty about 
the leader, and the behaviour of other members of the group, but because of 
uncertainty about one’s own characteristics too. 
 
Peoples’ uncertainties about their own characteristics provide a significant 
opportunity for plausible leaders who are a good judge of character. The leader can 
invite people who, in their judgement, have the correct characteristics, to join their 
group. People who feel very uncertain about their own characteristics are likely to 
respond in a positive fashion to such an invitation. Trusting people are also likely to 
respond, as they are more likely to accept the leader’s judgement. An honest leader, 
pursuing a socially worthwhile project, can turn such mechanisms to good advantage, 
but it is equally obvious that an unscrupulous leader can take advantage of vulnerable 
followers too. The most vulnerable people are those who are unaware that their own 
uncertainties, and trusting nature, are very obvious to others. Those whose 
competencies are obviously limited are particularly vulnerable, because it is obvious 
that they will receive few offers from other leaders. They may, however, receive some 
offers from honest but highly altruistic leaders, who wish to save them from falling 
under the influence of unscrupulous leaders instead. 
 
The changing nature of competition between leaders 
   18
The nature of competition between leaders has been changed fundamentally by the 
growth of the communications and media industries – from the growth of print 
journalism in the eighteenth century to the spread cinema, radio and television in the 
twentieth century. The lower cost of mass communication has intensified competition 
between the leaders of high-level groups – especially political parties. 
 
Most significantly, the technologies of photography, film and video have reduced the 
cost of pictures relative to words, giving pictorial images an increasing role in 
propaganda and persuasion. Images liberate arguments from the requirement of a 
literate readership. They make use of a natural visual language which transcends any 
specific written language, and therefore reaches a mass multi-lingual audience (the 
links between culture and language are explored further from an economic 
perspective in Jones, 2000). 
 
Certain images elicit strong emotional reactions. These reactions are almost 
instantaneous, and are therefore invaluable to leaders in gaining attention for their 
messages.  Indeed, these reactions are so strong that the image itself may become the 
argument. Pictures of starving children, or police brutality, for example, make their 
own political points without any need for verbal interpretation. 
 
Competition between leaders for visual attention encourages the pursuit of the 
outrageous. In any collection of competing images, the most outrageous is likely to 
win. People may be attracted by beauty, but surprise and horror have an even greater 
fascination. 
 
The abstract nature of competition between ideologies does not lend itself readily to 
visual expression. The loss of media space to more visual subjects may be one reason 
why vigorous political debate appears to have declined as consumption of media 
services has increased. Social projects are easier to promote, as visions of better 
houses, schools and hospitals are easy to project. This encourages politicians to argue 
less about ideology and more about specific projects – a strategy recently adopted by 
New Labour in the UK (Protherough and Pick, 2002). 
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Consumer products are remarkably easy to promote, by picturing the consumer as 
relaxed and self-assured; this works particularly well for simple products which 
provide emotional benefits of a social nature – cosmetics and alcoholic beverages, for 
example. The multi-lingual nature of a visual proposition benefits multinational 
consumer brands. 
 
Commercial advertisers are unlikely to increase their sales if consumers give money 
to good causes instead of spending it on themselves. The implicit message of a typical 
product advertisement is therefore that low-trust is the norm. Similarly, many 
products are advertised as impulse purchases, which allow the consumer to show off 
in a social setting. This promotes a low-tension spontaneous lifestyle as the norm, 
rather than a single-minded high-tension lifestyle which would produce better long-
term results. 
 
Faces attract attention – particularly faces that are instantly recognised. This favours 
the promotion of ideas through celebrity endorsement. Since sportsmen and 
entertainers are not generally noted for their political wisdom, celebrity endorsement 
works best in product promotion, although it has been used with some success in 
politics too. 
 
The optimisation of visual image for persuasive purposes requires very scarce skills. 
Creative workers in advertising and public relations can command substantial 
economic rents. The financial requirements of major promotional campaigns 
constitute a significant barrier to entry for many types of leader. A highly visual 
political campaign may require powerful industry backers, who expect rewards if their 
candidate is elected to office. Thus leadership becomes more like commercial 
entrepreneurship as the economic requirements converge on the funding of media 
campaigns. 
 
In most modern societies newspapers, magazines, radio and television rely heavily on 
advertising revenues rather than sales and subscriptions. They have a strong financial 
incentive to attract an audience that is susceptible to advertisers’ messages. This can 
induce the ‘dumbing down’ of content in order to attract the people most likely to be 
influenced by the visual message that the advertiser plans to use. Some messages are   20
easier to dumb down than others – for example, a blatant appeal to short-term self-
interest is easier to communicate than a sophisticated appeal to long-term social 
concerns. 
 
To summarise, there are many reasons why, in a modern society characterised by 
competitive individualism, the role of moral leadership is difficult to carry out. Whilst 
the power of visual imagery favours the promotion of certain types of charitable 
project – e.g. child poverty and animal welfare – it discriminates against the 
promotion of high-trust high-tension political values. Competition for attention in the 
visual media is, on average, biased against the promotion of high-trust cultural values. 
 
Part 3: Key Dimensions of Culture 
 
Four main dimensions of cultural variation 
 
There are many fundamental issues which cultures must address. Some are very 
general, such as ‘What are people really like?’, whilst others are more specific, such 
as ‘Who can you trust?’ and ‘How do you motivate people?’ Other issues include 
‘What forms of organisation are natural?’ and ‘How far can technological progress 
advance?’ Describing a culture in full can therefore be a very complex task. 
 
A parsimonious theory of culture must identify just a small number of dimensions 
along which cultures vary. By focusing on those aspects of culture which are likely to 
influence economic performance, four main dimensions of culture can be derived. 
These dimensions were introduced at the outset, and are summarised in the first two 
columns of Table 2. The first column of the table identifies the end of the dimension 
which is found in a typical Western ‘competitive individualistic society’, whilst the 
second column indicates the dimension which corresponds to ‘Utopian solidarity’ – 
the kind of culture that would be found in an idyllic closed society of the kind 
visualised by Rousseau. This four-way classification is a refinement of a classification 
proposed in Casson (1993). 
 
Individualism versus collectivism 
An individualist believes that people are autonomous. Everyone is different, and   21
values personal ‘lifestyle’ projects above others (Earl, 1986). The information 
required for coordination is widely distributed—shocks are individual-specific. 
Ownership and control of resources should be vested in individuals, since only 
individuals have the information required to take decisions that affect themselves.  
 
A collectivist believes that we are all part of the community into which we were born. 
Even as adults we remain dependent on others for our survival. A collectivist also 
believes in uniformity—everyone is the same, and values large awesome projects. 
Information required for coordination is centralised– shocks have collective impact. 
Collectivists believe that ownership and control of resources should be vested in the 
group (Ekelund and Tollison, 1997). 
 
Pragmatism versus  Proceduralism 
Pragmatists believe that intuitive judgements based on wide personal experience hold 
the key to successful decisions. Hunches can also be tested through informal 
conversation with other people. The best decisions are made promptly. A single 
individual should be ultimately responsible for each decision. 
 
Proceduralists believe that good decisions are generated by closely following formal 
procedures, whose design is underpinned by theory, and which involve the systematic 
collection of objective information. The use of committees may delay decisions, but it 
is better to ‘get it right’ than to do it quickly. 
 
Low-trust versus high-trust 
High-trust individuals believe that others will be honest, work hard, be loyal, and 
generally keep their promises even when they have little material incentive to do so.  
Low-trust individuals believe that others are guided by material incentives, and will 
therefore often lie, cheat or shirk. High-trust is particularly important in an 
individualistic society, because individuals do not have the same power of 
enforcement as a collective body (Holmes and Sunstein, 1999). 
 
High-tension versus low-tension. 
A high-tension person is attracted to ambitious projects, while low-tension person 
prefers easy projects. The high-tension person is stressed because they are aiming   22
high, and will be ashamed of failure. (For an excellent discussion of high-tension in 
the context of fundamentalist religious sects see Stark and Bainbridge, 1987.) 
Conversely, a low-tension person is relaxed, because they are aiming low, and they 
will blame any failure on factors outside their control. Low-tension people like to 
behave in a spontaneous manner, which often has anti-social consequences (Casson, 
2002), although it is a manner of which some economists approve (Scitovsky, 1976). 
 
There are many other classifications of culture, which have been devised for a variety 
of purposes, but there is one particular classification, due to Hofstede, which has been 
particularly influence in management and organisational studies, and is particularly 
relevant to performance issues (Hofstede, 1980, Graham, 2001). Hofstede 
classification was arrived at empirically, by applying factor analysis to a large-scale 
cross-national study of the employees of a multinational firm. Unlike the 
classification used here, Hofstede did not deduce his classification from first 
principles. But nevertheless a comparison is useful. It is interesting that he also 
focused on four dimensions, some (though not all) of which correspond to the 
theoretical classification, as noted in the third column of Table 2. 
 
Taking the two limits of each of the four dimensions key dimensions described above 
identifies 16 ideal types of culture, which are presented in Table 3. Some of these are 
particularly interesting, especially the high-trust analogues of competitive 
individualism. These embody the principle of voluntary association for the purpose of 
pursuing ambitious projects, but add the notion that the aims of the project may be 
altruistic, that competition between the projects is orderly rather than aggressive, and 
that coordination of projects relies heavy on trust between members of a team. It is 
known as associationism. 
 
To keep the theory really simple, it would be nice to identify just one of these 16 
cultures as the best from a performance point of view. It would then be possible to 
compare the actual culture of any social group with the ideal culture, and measure 
how many dimensions were in agreement. The closer the actual culture to the ideal 
culture, the better the economy would perform. Given the advantages of a high-trust 
culture in reducing agency costs and transaction costs, some form of associationism 
would be a natural choice. The form that is closest to classic Western individualism is   23
entrepreneurial associationism, and so this appears to be the natural choice as the 
ideal. 
 
Trade-offs involved in a high-performance culture 
 
There are three difficulties associated with identifying entrepreneurial associationism 
as the unique high-performance culture, however. The first is that a combination of 
four extreme values is rarely an optimal choice in any problem. There are strong 
grounds for believing that along each of the four dimensions there is scope for a trade-
off (the importance of trade-offs in culture is recognised by many writers on culture, 
see, e,g, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1997). Typical results of the trade-offs 
are summarised in the right-hand column of Table 2. They may be summarised as 
follows, taking each dimension in turn. 
 
Voluntarism: Individuals are encouraged to transfer their resources to institutions on a 
voluntary basis. They are encouraged to identify opportunities for projects which 
these institutions can carry out. Individuals like group projects, but prefer to choose 
the type of project with which they are involved 
 
Good judgement 
Procedures work well in dealing with frequent minor shocks of a transitory nature. 
Improvisation is required in dealing with intermittent major shocks of a persistent 
nature. Successful improvisation requires good judgement, which is based on wide 
experience. 
 
Selective warranted trust: Whilst trust reduces coordination costs, naïve trust is of 
little value, since naïve people provide easy pickings for cheats. A high-trust 
equilibrium is what counts, in which the majority of people, who are trustworthy, can 
identify each other, and transact with each other, whilst the minority of people who 
are untrustworthy cannot transact at all. Trust is engineered through moral leadership. 
Leaders demand loyalty and hard work from those who join their teams.  
 
Warranted self-confidence. 
High tension delivers results in task-oriented projects. But high-tension cannot be   24
sustained indefinitely. A high-tension person relaxes in a secure environment where 
they reflect on their performance and learn from their mistakes. The low-tension 
person likes to mess around at work, and have lots of fun when relaxing. 
 
A combination of voluntarism, good judgement, selective warranted trust and 
warranted self-confidence may be termed refined associationism, and may be taken as 
the most accurate characterisation of optimal culture from a performance point of 
view. 
 
The second difficulty with this choice is that none of the forms of associationism 
discussed above correspond to the cultures of the most successful Western economies. 
These tend to be much lower-trust than associationism would imply. It could therefore 
be argued that the entire theory is a predictive failure. 
 
This leads on to the third point, however, which is that the exact position of the trade-
off will reflect the local circumstances with which a culture has to contend. Thus a 
very large, transient and widely-dispersed group may have to reconcile itself to lower 
levels of trust than a small, stable and compact group. It is therefore unrealistic to 
expect every group to conform to the same ideal. In another case, one group may have 
an outstanding moral leader – a ‘man of the moment’, say – who intervenes at a 
critical movement when change is required, whereas another groups may have to cope 
without such a leader. Drawing upon a larger number of less able, and less 
trustworthy individuals to do the same job, they may institute a division of powers 
between the leaders, and even endeavour to promote a degree of competition between 
them. 
 
It is, in fact, possible to explain the current predominace of competitive individualism 
in successful Western countries such as the US in terms of adaptation to changing 
global conditions in the period since World War 2. In the post-war period, volatility 
has increased as a result of accelerated technological change and the globalisation of 
trade, driven by lower transport costs and tariffs. An increase in the volatility favours 
a switch from collectivism to individualism, and from proceduralsim to pragmatism, 
because of the need for greater flexibility (for earlier examples of such switching see 
Hirschman, 1982). Globalisation has also reduced trust between trading partners, as   25
local networks of trade have been disrupted by the emergence of foreign competition; 
social trust has been eroded too, as migration has disrupted the customs of local 
communities. The globalisation of communications has encourage a switch from low-
tension to high-tension culture, as people in low-productivity economies have become 
aware of the opportunities presented by innovation and export-led growth. Countries 
across the world have therefore switched towards a specific type of competitive 
individualism, namely an individualistic, pragmatic, low-trust high-tension ‘enterprise 
culture’, as indicated in the top left-hand cell of Table 3. 
 
The economic theory of culture therefore predicts that culture will adapt to the 
environment, both across space and over time. This accords with basic economic 
intuition that despite all the qualifications noted above, a successful culture must 
correspond closely to the realities of a situation facing a group. As circumstances 
change, so the optimal culture changes too, and forces of adaptation, driven by 
competition between rival leaders, come into play. 
 
Refining the dimensions of culture 
 
Sociological writers on culture have, between them, identified over a hundred 
different dimensions of culture. Furthermore, cultural analysis of cross-country 
differences in industrial policy has identified other dimensions besides those 
mentioned above (Foreman-Peck and Federico, 1999). Almost all of these additional 
dimensions can, however, be subsumed under the four key dimensions; indeed, these 
key dimensions were developed, in part, as composite dimensions, under which 
various other dimensions could be subsumed. Table 4 lists 22 dimensions of culture, 
including many of the most frequently cited dimensions, and attributes each of them 
to one of the four key categories. 
 
Where issues relating to political constitutions and national economic policy are 
concerned, the sub-dimensions associated with the first dimension – individualism 
versus collectivism – are most important. Where issues of organisational structure and 
management style are concerned, the sub-dimensions associated with pragmatism 
versus proceduralism are most important. The quality of personal relationships within 
organisations, the intensity of competition between organisations, and the general   26
quality of social life, are governed by the sub-divisions of the third dimension – the 
degree of trust. The extent to which people are energized and inspired by visions of 
better life –either for themselves or others – is governed by the sub-divisions of the 
fourth dimension – the degree of tension. Since there is insufficient space to examine 
each of these sub-dimensions in detail, their principal features are summarised in 
Tables 5-8. 
 
Some of these dimensions are much more relevant at one level of leadership than 
another. Individualism versus collectivism, and the sub-dimensions associated with it, 
are particularly important for high-level leaders of large groups such as the nation 
state. They influence their attitude to the decentralisation of power. A high-level 
leader must decide how far his followers should be allowed to form lower-level 
groups on their own initiative. Should the emergence of lower leaders be encouraged, 
as a welcome display of initiative, or discouraged as a potential threat to the leader’s 
power? Other dimensions apply at every level. The issue of trust, for example, is 
fundamental at every level. A high-level leader who does not trust lower-level leaders 
will either discourage the formation of low-level groups, or will promote aggressive 
competition with them, whereas a trusting leader may encourage low-level groups and 
promote co-operation and orderly competition between them (Knight, 1935). At the 
same time, leaders of lower level groups must decide whether to monitor their 
members and offer material rewards for good behaviour, or whether to trust the 
members to monitor themselves and to reward themselves emotionally for good 
behaviour. 
 
Part Four: Method and History 
 
Methodological issues in modelling culture 
 
This third and final part of the chapter attempts to draw together the threads of the 
preceding discussion.  It begins by summarising the principal differences between 
conventional neoclassical economics and the economic theory of culture outlined 
above. Five main differences have been identified. Contrary to conventional 
neoclassical economics, the economic theory of culture asserts that:   27
?? Information is costly, both to collect and communicate. Where fundamental 
issues are concerned it is often impossible to collect objective evidence that 
will discriminate between alternative theories. Thus different systems of 
beliefs can co-exist almost indefinitely. Conflicts between rival value systems 
are even more difficult to resolve; their authority often derives from tradition, 
or from spiritual experiences, whose authenticity it is impossible to assess. 
Information costs explain uncertainty – uncertainty exists because it is 
prohibitively costly to collect all the relevant information before taking a 
decision. Many uncertainties are radical and existential, because fundamental 
issues are peculiarly difficult to resolve. It is not just ‘facts’ that are uncertain 
– theories are uncertain too. 
?? The economic environment is volatile. Factual information is therefore 
continually obsolescing. A steady flow of new information is required to 
permit the economy to adapt appropriately to changing circumstances. 
Information sources are localised, so different people have access to different 
information. Furthermore, since different people use different theories to 
interpret this information, different people will react to similar events in very 
different ways. An important advantage of decentralisation is that it empowers 
people to act immediately on their judgement of a situation. Where opinions 
differ about the advisability of change, competition permits the optimists to 
bid resources away from the pessimists, and so the weight of opinion, as 
expressed in the market, determines whether how much change takes place. 
?? Because information is a public good, it is inefficient to replicate its collection 
unless communication costs are high. Furthermore, it is better to concentrate 
information processing on people with a comparative advantage in 
interpretation – i.e. those whose beliefs are closest to the truth. These will tend 
to be the people with a track record of successful decisions. Intermediaries 
therefore emerge, who specialise in processing information of particular kinds. 
Entrepreneurs intermediate by setting up new firms to sell new products, 
whilst social leaders intermediate by setting up new clubs and charities. 
?? Each person’s utility depends upon emotional as well as material rewards. 
Change often elicits a powerful emotional response. Some people thrive on the 
excitement of change, while others fear its consequences. Leaders need to be   28
calm when taking decisions – they have to be confident in their judgements. 
They also need to understand the anxieties of their followers, and provide 
them with reassurance if they can. 
?? Emotions are morally framed. Pride and self-esteem on the one-hand, and guilt 
and shame on the other, are powerful emotions. Leaders can associate positive 
emotions with actions that promote coordination and negative emotions with 
actions that undermine coordination. This engineers trust, and so reduces 
agency costs and transactions costs. Improved coordination enhances the 
performance of the group. The leader can recover his costs from this enhanced 
performance by various means – taxes, membership fees, voluntary donations 
-  depending upon the type of group involved.  
 
These assumptions are perfectly compatible with a rational action approach to 
modelling. However, the detailed specification of a model is rendered difficult by the 
fact that both theories and facts are uncertain. Nevertheless, the basic structure of the 
model can be set out using three propositions. 
?? Leadership operates at different levels. High-level leaders control nation 
states, organised religions and international pressure groups. Middle-level 
leaders manage firms, clubs and charities, whilst low-level leaders manage 
families and local communities. High-level leaders set a high-level culture 
within which the other leaders must operate. Lower-level leaders can ‘free-
ride’ on useful values and beliefs inculcated by the high-level leader, but if 
they disagree with the values promoted at the higher level they must invest in 
counteracting them. This issue separates people into those who prefer to 
assimilate and conform, and those who oppose or resist instead (Jones, 1984). 
?? Followers have a choice of leader. In a democracy they are free to vote for a 
political party, and to practice their preferred religion; they can also decide 
which firm to work for, which clubs to join, and which charities to support. 
People recognise that when they decide to follow the leader of a particular 
group, they must adopt his values and beliefs. Many key decisions regarding 
choice of leader are made around the time a person comes of age. Using the 
prior beliefs inculcated in their childhood by their family and community, 
people decide which leaders they will follow in their adult life. They evaluate   29
the risk that given leader’s values and beliefs will turn out to be wrong. They 
take account of their own personal characteristics, as they perceive them, 
because these will determine their emotional responses later on. The final 
choice that an individual makes will reflect not only his beliefs but also his 
preferences – whether he is selfish or altruistic, material or emotional , and so 
on. 
?? Leaders seek to optimise the values and beliefs they promote in order to fulfil 
their own objectives. Honest leaders will promote their true beliefs – acting on 
conviction – but dishonest leaders may adapt their values in order to maximise 
their following. Culture change will occur both through leaders modifying 
their values to maintain market share, and by followers switching between 
committed leaders who are unwilling, on principle, to adjust their values for 
the sake of expediency. 
 
These propositions show how the basic economic principles choice and competition 
can be applied to culture. The economic theory of culture subsumes standard 
neoclassical economics as a special case. In a simple neoclassical economic model, 
there is just a single culture which corresponds to the ‘true’ model of the economy. 
This ‘true’ model assumes that people are selfish and materialistic. It is therefore a 
model of a low-trust society. The high-trust alternative is excluded by assumption. It 
is also a model of an individualistic society, since people care nothing about the 
welfare of others and take a purely instrumental view of the kind of society in which 
they live (for a comprehensive critique along these lines see Roberts and Holden, 




The empirical and historical literature linking culture to economic performance is 
extremely diffuse. It is possible, however, to identify three specific issues which have 
had a significant impact on the economic analysis of culture: the Weber thesis, 
obstacles to development, and the role of freedom. 
 
 Economic historians have long debated the Weber thesis that the Protestant Ethic 
promoted the growth of capitalism (Weber, 1930). There is broad agreement that the   30
spread of international commerce in Europe coincided with the Reformation (although 
pre-reformation origins in Italian city-states must not be overlooked). Causality has 
been questioned, however. The Protestant Ethic can also be understood as 
accommodating Christian beliefs to the requirements of an emerging mercantile 
middle-class (Schlicht, 1995). Behind the theological revolution, therefore, a vested 
business interest may be detected. Protestanism ‘dis-intermediated’ the Papacy, and 
gave people a direct relationship with God through prayer. It undermined the case for 
paying the church for indulgences and the upkeep of chantries, and for obeying 
prohibitions on usury – and thereby reduced the economic burdens on the middle-
class. 
 
The theological content had real effects, however. The Protestant convert accepted 
grace through personal salvation. The sign of grace was not monastic seclusion, as 
before, but spreading the Gospel through engagement with the world. Business was a 
‘calling’ which could promote missionary work. It supported the expansion of 
commercial empires into the ‘darker corners’ of the world. Whilst the origins of 
Protestantism may be questioned, therefore, its effects appear to be those which 
Weber predicted. Protestantism replaced the collectivist and procedural culture of the 
Roman Catholic church with a more individualistic and pragmatic culture, which 
formed the foundations of the competitive individualism that characterises the West 
today. 
 
Jones (1981, 1988) examines the ‘take off’ of commercialism in Western Europe from 
a different perspective, and arrives at rather similar conclusions. Jones regards 
entrepreneurship as a natural human behaviour, which supports survival by 
encouraging people to show initiative in meeting their material needs. 
Entrepreneurship can, however be stifled by political tyrannies, in which collectivism 
and proceduralism are imposed (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). The motive is to 
monopolise the tax-base and use its revenues to support a leisured lifestyle for the 
elite. From this perspective, the Reformation is a protest movement which, by   
overthrowing a parasitic religious elite, liberates people to follow their natural 
entrepreneurial inclinations. China, and other Asian powers, have never liberated 
themselves in this way: when one elite is deposed, another simply takes its place.   31
Once again, however, the explanation may be cultural – perhaps Western society is 
intolerant of political oppression in the way that some Asian societies are not. 
 
Development economists have addressed similar issues, but from a more secular 
perspective (Bardhan, 2000). A drive to ‘modernise’ post-colonial societies is 
typically advocated (McClelland and Winter, 1969). In the 1960s modernisation 
became the secular equivalent of the Protestant ethic. The object was to engineer a 
high-tension society, driven by a desire to catch up with the West, in place of a low-
tension society where people are content with low living standards and high mortality. 
Individualism was a secondary consideration: in the 1960s planned industrialisation 
behind protective tariffs was the recommended strategy, and it was only in the 1990s 
that privatisation and liberalisation took over. 
 
A major obstacle to economic development in the poorest countries is weak internal 
communications, which perpetuates a cellular social structure based on local family 
and tribal loyalties. High levels of local trust are combined with low levels of trust at 
the national level. National government is too corrupt to intermediate the flow of 
funds between international agencies and local people.  Engineering trust at the 
national level has been accomplished in a number of Asian economies but, with one 
or two notable exceptions, there has been little success in Africa. As noted earlier, 
creating a high-tension high-trust society has proved difficult even in prosperous 
Western countries. 
 
The disintegration of Soviet communism has led to a resurgence in research dedicated 
to showing that ‘freedom’ holds the key to economic performance (Gwartney and 
Lawson, 2003). The guarantor of freedom is usually said to be a US-style constitution 
(Scully, 1992). A range of freedom indicators has been developed, and cross-country 
statistical regressions have been reported which confirm their impacts on living 
standards and economic growth. On the whole, these regressions simply confirm that, 
other things being equal, Western-style competitive individualism promotes economic 
growth. The point is not difficult to make if sufficient poor African dictatorships are 
included in the sample of countries. 
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Advocates of freedom as the critical factor are usually unsympathetic to a cultural 
interpretation of their findings, and this biases the way in which they interpret their 
results They typically believe that laws, not morals, reduce agency costs and 
transaction costs. They believe that a written constitution enforced through impartial 
courts is better than an unwritten constitution enforced through social sanctions.  They 
believe the biological drives, such as greed and aggression, are better guarantors of 
competition than a genuine desire to benefit the customer. They therefore ignore 
crucial issues, such as why greedy judges do not accept bribes, and how the basic 
needs of people with low incomes are met. 
 
As in any cross-section regression, there are omitted variables, and much of the 
sample variation remains unexplained. The apparent significance of some of the 
variables may be due to the presence of omitted cultural variables, including the 
legacy of traditional religion (Kohut, Green, Keeter and Tuth, 2000). Whilst these 
regressions are a significant advance on anecdotal evidence, the range of explanatory 
variables is too narrow to offer a full account of cultural factors in economic 
performance. 
 
The historical significance of culture is related to the historical significance of other 
intangible public goods, such as technological know-how. It is therefore not 
surprising that modern writers on convergence of national economic growth rates 
have begun to develop an interest in cultural issues. The traditional way of analysing 
the convergence of growth rates focuses on technological diffusion, but there is no 
reason why the analysis should not include cultural diffusion too. The rapid spread of 
free-market ideology in the 1990s, with many governments reducing tariffs and 
privatising and deregulating their utilities, is a clear example of cultural diffusion. 
Such cultural diffusion can lead to convergence in institutions as well as in rates of 
growth. 
 
A particularly interesting development has been the incorporation of religion in the 
convergence model (for a significant step in this direction see Barro and McCleary, 
2003). Whilst the European empires of the nineteenth century are often credited with 
the spread of Christianity, the US-led Western ‘empire’ of the late twentieth century is 
noted chiefly for its spread of secularism. This raises the issue of whether religion or   33
secularism is best for economic growth. If religion is best then the spread of 
secularism could lead to convergence on a sub-optimal level of growth. The analysis 
in this chapter suggests that it is the specific content of religious belief that is crucial 
in this respect, because it is the specific beliefs that determine the emotional incentive 
structure which motivates people. A simple distinction between religion and 
secularism is therefore too crude to properly identify the link between religious belief 
and economic performance. The impact of the spread of religion and culture on the 





This chapter has shown that the influence of culture on the economy extends well 
beyond the production and consumption of cultural goods in the field of media and 
the arts. Culture is concerned with the production and distribution of values and 
beliefs relating to fundamental issues. Cultural products are simply one of the means 
through which these values and beliefs are expressed. Identifying the fundamental 
issues addressed by culture is the key to analysing its impact on economic 
performance. 
 
Values and beliefs of a suitable kind can improve economic performance – both 
materially, and by enhancing quality of life. Culture is therefore an economic asset. 
Culture is shared by communication between the members of a social group. It is, in 
fact, an intangible durable public good. Significant investment is required to create 
and maintain this public good. Competition between cultures, in terms of relative 
economic performance, is essentially competition between social groups in investing 
in appropriate public goods of this type. 
 
By modifying five key assumptions of conventional neoclassical economics, and 
introducing a theory of leadership, it is possible, not only to explain how culture 
influences performance, but to explain how cultures will adapt to changing local 
conditions. 
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There are different levels of leadership, corresponding roughly to the size of the group 
that the leader controls. At any given level, the nature of competition is strongly 
influenced by the media that leaders employ to recruit and retain their followers. The 
development of mass media disseminating visual images has had a profound effect on 
ideological competition between political leaders. Changes in the media have made 
the promotion of high-trust cultures extremely difficult, whilst a sceptical attitude 
towards leadership in general has diminished the supply of able leaders. Distorted 
incentives in the market for leadership mean that the most effective culture does not 
always prevail. 
 
The ideal culture, from an economic point of view, is individualistic, pragmatic, high-
trust and high-tension, though each of these attributes must be moderated to some 
degree by the need to adapt the culture to local requirements. A simple way of  
summarising the advantages of this culture is to note that it is both entrepreneurial and 
moral. It is entrepreneurial because it encourages innovation and risk-taking, and it is 
moral because it discourages innovations, or risky ventures, that cause 
disproportionate damage to the interests of others. It is moral because it encourages 
honesty and loyalty, but it is entrepreneurial because it does so without stipulating 
rigid conformity to specific practices. 
 
The high-performance culture also encourages both freedom and responsibility. 
Freedom allows diversity of behaviour, and thereby facilitates innovation. It also 
decentralises power: it allows decisions to be taken by people who have immediate 
access to relevant information, and so avoids the expense and delay of referring 
straightforward decisions to higher authority. Responsibility, however, requires 
people to show consideration for others (Ellickson, 1991). In respecting other 
people’s freedoms, they accept constraints on their own. They consult with other 
people before acting in an unexpected way. 
 
Consultation is effected both formally and informally. A high-trust culture encourages 
people to honour informal agreements. A legalistic culture sets out rights and 
responsibilities, records them and enforces them. People are obliged to negotiate with 
people who hold the relevant rights before they act. Informal methods work well with 
members of a tightly-knit social group - friends, relatives and neighbours - whilst   35
formal methods are more appropriate for more impersonal groups. A moral culture 
will rely on trust to as much as possible, but will underpin trust by the rule of law. 
 
The high-performance culture respects both tradition and modernity. Embracing 
modernity promotes scientific research, and the practical application of science in 
engineering, medicine. It also encourages economy through the systematic 
elimination of waste. Tradition, on the other hand, underpins many core moral values. 
Conflict can ensue when scientific discoveries appear to undermine traditional 
religious beliefs on which conventional morality is based. Some religions are more 
vulnerable than others on this score, however. An entrepreneurial culture is not devoid 
of religion, but rather involves religious beliefs which co-exist with a scientific view 
of the world. 
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Table 1 
 




Type of group  Membership system 
Nation state  Citizen by birth or naturalisation. Tax-payer 
by residence 
Market  All buyers and sellers of a product are 
members of the relevant market - especially 
competing sellers who locate close to each 
other 
Network  Member by regular contact with other 
members—often met through introductions 
arranged by existing members 
For-profit associations: firm  Member by negotiation. Core members 
supply services on a regular basis: e.g. 
shareholders and employees. Customers may 
be regular, casual, or one-off purchasers. 
Non-profit associations: profession, club, 
church, charity, political party, etc. 
Member by application, invitation, 
qualification or election 
Local community: friends, school etc.  Member by residential location.  
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Table 2 
 


















Individualism  Collectivism  Individualism-
Collectivism 
Voluntarism 




Low-trust  High-trust    Warranted trust 






Note: Only three of the four dimensions identified by Hofstede appear in the table. 
The missing Power-distance dimension in the Hofstede classification may be loosely 
construed as a hybrid which combines elements of individualism – collectivism with 




Typology of cultures 
 
 




































































limited to relief of 
current problems 
such as poverty. 
Individuals act on 
impulse to help 
the needy who are 
known to them 
Charity culture: 
Compassionate 
leaders set up 
formal 
organisations to 
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ambition simply to 
survive in power 
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Table 4 
 








Individualistic (I)  Collectivistic (C) 
Atomistic  Organic 
Dynamic  Static 
Incremental  Radical 
Democratic  Elitist 
Market-based  Planning-based 
Efficiency-oriented  Equity-oriented 
Consumer-oriented  Producer-oriented 
   
Pragmatic (G)  Procedural (D) 
Empirical  Theoretical 
Outcome-based  Process-based 
Risk-taking  Risk-averse 
Artistic  Scientific 
Personal  Impersonal 
   
Low-trust (S)  High-trust (T) 
Unprincipled (moral scepticism)  Principled (morally committed) 
Secular  Religious 
Selfish  Altruistic 
Autocratic  Consultative 
Aggressive  Orderly 
   
High-Tension (H)  Low-Tension (L) 
Aspirational  Complacent 
Deliberative  Spontaneous 
Optimistic  Pessimistic 
Confident  Unsure 












Commentary  High-performance mix 
Atomistic / 
Organic 
An atomist believes that individuals 
are autonomous and independent of 
society. Their personal rewards 
derive from their own activities, and 
their attitude to others is purely 
instrumental. Atomists play down 
emotions as a source of utility, and 
emphasise pleasure from material 
consumption instead. Organicists 
believe that the most important 
rewards are emotional, and derive 
from participation in social activity. 
Activities devoted to improving and 
strengthening society generate 
especially large rewards. The more 
sacrificial effort people put in, the 
greater the emotional rewards they 
get out. 
Atomism is bad psychology, since it 
underestimates the importance of 
emotional rewards, particularly those 
derive from harmonious social 
interaction. The atomist is correct, 
however, that ultimately it is 
individuals that take decisions. A 
high-performance culture recognises 
that economic performance depends 
on the interaction of numerous 
individual decisions—decisions taken 
by people with real concerns about the 
society in which they live. 
Dynamic / 
Static 
A dynamic culture regards the 
environment as highly volatile. 
Change is endemic, and it is 
necessary to adapt and evolve in 
order to survive. Change is exciting 
and people can thrive on it. A static 
culture believes that the environment 
is stable. Change can be neutralised 
in order to preserve the status quo. 
Homeostasis provides much-needed 
security. 
The environment is volatile. Major 
changes usually require adaptation, 
but minor changes can sometimes be 
neutralised by an appropriate respond. 
People can only stand so much 
excitement from change.   46
Incremental / 
Radical 
An incrementalist believes that 
changes are typically small and 
localised. They relate to particular 
products or places. The people close 
to the changes are in the best 
position to respond. A decentralised 
system that empowers individual 
decision-making produces the most 
effective responses. A radical 
believes that changes affect the 
entire economy. Radical actions are 
required to take advantage of new 
opportunities or respond to emergent 
threats. This requires a centralisation 
of power. 
Volatility in the environment takes 
different forms. Minor changes occur 
all the time, whilst major changes 
occur only intermittently. Minor 
changes can easily be delegated to 
individuals to handle; indeed, standard 
procedures can be developed to deal 
with the most common types of 
change. Major changes can take many 
different forms, and require a more 
consultative and collective response. 
Leaders have an important role in 
building consensus where radical 
change is required. 
Democratic/ 
Elitist 
A democrat believes that everyone 
has unique life experiences which 
make them worth consulting on how 
to respond to major changes. So far 
as minor changes are concerned, 
they can be left to handle them 
themselves. 
 
An elitist believes that only a select 
group of people, of high intelligence 
or ’good breeding’, etc., have the 
ability to form correct opinions, and 
to carry out the appropriate 
calculations 
Leaders are specialists in taking 
complex decisions. Leaders constitute 
an elite—but they should be an ‘open 
elite’ which anyone can attempt to 
join. Leaders should consult their 
followers, but ultimately they must act 
on their own judgement. Ineffective 
leaders should be replaced—followers 
should be able to replace a bad leader, 
or quit a badly-performing group. 
Leadership roles require people of 
exceptional ability, but this ability is 




The atomist recognises that markets 
provide the flexibility that allows 
different people to respond in 
different ways to similar events. 
Market-making middlemen adjust 
prices to match long-run supply and 
demand; they also hold inventories 
to buffer short-run fluctuations. 
 
From an organic perspective, 
planning is the most direct means of 
achieving consistency between 
individual responses, since it uses a 
single directing mind. A planner may 
administer prices or ration quantities. 
Planning and markets need to be 
combined. Firms are planning units 
which coordinate tightly-coupled 
systems. Households also plan, but on 
a smaller scale. Markets link these 
different planning systems in a 
loosely-coupled way. Factor markets 
price the labour and capital employed 
by firms. Firms which attempt to plan 
activities which are better coordinated 
by a market will fail to break even. By 
allocating scarce factor supplies to the 
most viable firms, the factor markets 
determine which activities are planned 




The atomist exploits market 
competition to eliminate waste. An 
inefficient producer cannot match 
the price of an efficient producer, 
and so customer switching 
eliminates wasteful production 
methods. Consumers who value 
products most out-bid those who 
value them least, so outputs are not 
wasted by consumers who do not 
value them. The organicist notes that 
a consumer’s ability to pay depends 
on income. Consumption should 
reflect basic needs and social status. 
Since basic needs are similar, 
necessities should be allocated fairly. 
Luxuries should reward service to 
society as a whole, and not just 
wealth derived from scarce factors of 
production. 
People care both about their own 
consumption and about the kind of 
society in which they live. Market-
based incentives to eliminate wealth 
can make everyone better off, but only 
if those who make the savings are 
prepared to share them with others. If 
they are forced to share them, then the 
incentive to make the effort to drive 
out waste is reduced. An ethic of 
community solidarity, which provides 
emotional rewards to those who 
reduce waste for the benefit of others 
is the best solution. Thus a market 
system can usefully be supplemented 
by a ‘honours system’, provided that 
honours are awarded for sacrificial 






The atomist believes that people 
derive rewards mainly from material 
consumption. Novelty and fashion, 
packaging and presentation, are not 
trivial matters, but sources of serious 
satisfaction. The proliferation of 
different product varieties made 
possible by technology and trade is 
to be welcomed. So too are the 
efficiency gains generated by 
specialisation, even though work 
becomes monotonous. Services are 
also valuable, even though no 
tangible artefact is produced.  
 
Organicists believe that people 
derive rewards mainly from 
producing goods. They value 
product variation only when it arises 
from the use of local materials, and 
from the personal style of the 
worker. They value tangible product 
over intangible services, and craft 
work over mass production. 
Producer motivation is strengthened 
by a long-term relationship with the 
customer which allows the producer 
to witness his product in use. 
Consumer culture promotes the 
development of new technology. It 
exploits advances in technology and 
communication to significantly 
improve the material living standards 
of the poor. 
 
However, workers ‘alienated’ by mass 
production will produce poor quality, 
so ‘job enrichment’, which limits 
specialisation, may actually improve 
overall efficiency. They may also seek 
enrichment through trade union 
activism. 
 
Not all workers may require job 
satisfaction, however. Satisfactions 
can also be obtained from hobbies and 
recreations. Boring jobs may indirectly 
enrich cultural life by encouraging 
people to seek satisfaction in 










Commentary  High-performance mix 
Empirical / 
Theoretical 
A pragmatist believes that the response 
to change should be based on evidence 
rather than theory—it should be 
improvised on the basis of previous 
experience. Everyone has unique life 
experiences which help to prepare 
them for taking decisions. Belief in the 
uniqueness of personal experience 
links pragmatism to atomism. A 
proceduralist believes that decisions 
should be explicitly rational, in the 
sense of being grounded in some 
theory. Without the correct theory, 
evidence cannot be properly 
interpreted. Decisions should be based 
on calculation rather than 
improvisation. Since the mastery of 
theory often requires intellectual 
ability, theoretical orientation is often 
linked to elitism. 
Theory and experience need to be 
combined. Neither evidence without 
theory, not theory without evidence, 
will produce good decisions on how to 
respond to change. In some situations 
there is no relevant theory, whereas in 
other cases there are multiple theories, 
and hence confusion. Theories 
invariably abstract from certain factors, 
and may therefore distort a decision if 
the omitted factor is important. On the 
other hand, ignoring relevant theory 
can mean that the significance of key 




Proceduralists believe that a correct 
theory can suggest a rational procedure 
which will guarantee a correct 
decision. A group of people (e.g. a 
committee) may be involved in taking 
the decision. Pragmatists believe that 
procedures normally delay a decision, 
and make the outcome worse. 
Disagreements in committees can add 
to delays; it is better to make one 
person clearly responsible for a 
decision, and let them ‘get on with it’ 
right away. 
Rational procedures may be useful in 
dealing with transitory volatility—e.g. 
in recording reservations or managing 
inventory. But there are few cases 
where theory is good enough to 
identify an optimal procedure. 
Procedures can also be useful in 
encouraging autocratic individuals to 
consult with knowledgeable people. 
Otherwise, it is individual experience 
that is crucial. Selecting the right 
individual is more important than 
optimising the procedure they employ.   49




A proceduralist believes that risk can 
be reduced through rational decision-
making processes, whereas a 
pragmatist denies this. The 
proceduralist worries that correct 
procedures have not been properly 
followed, whereas the pragmatist, 
having improvised his decision, simply 
sits back and waits for events to 
unfold. 
Large intermittent shocks cannot easily 
be addressed by routine procedures, 
and so risk is inescapable. Frequent 
minor shocks can often be addressed 
by rational procedures which involve 
collecting and processing information 
before a decision is made. The 
collection of information allows risk to 
be managed, although it cannot be 
eliminated altogether. People who are 
responsible for dealing with large 
intermittent shocks must be willing to 
take substantial risks. 
Artistic / 
Scientific 
Science analyses local situations in 
terms of timeless universal laws, 
whereas the artist often expresses 
surprise and wonder at a situation. The 
scientist typically values uniformity 
whereas the artist values diversity. A 
scientific approach supports the 
development of a theory, and the 
collection of evidence in a systematic 
way. It therefore underpins a 
procedural approach. Art tends to 
emphasise an emotional or even 
mystical response to a situation which 
is not fully understood. It focuses on 
situations which are difficult, or 
impossible, to understand in purely 
scientific terms. It therefore supports a 
pragmatic approach to decision-
making. 
Economic theory has employed social 
scientific principles, such as the 
division of labour, specialisation 
according to comparative advantage 
and global competition, with 
considerable success. Decision-makers 
who do not understand these principles 
are at a major disadvantage in business 
life. 
 
Economics has proved much less 
successful, however, in analysing the 
emotional rewards that people derive 
from work and social activity. A 
combination of scientific understanding 
of the laws of markets on the one hand, 
and an artistic appreciation of 
emotional factors on the other, is 
therefore the appropriate combination 
for successful decision-making.   51
Personal / 
Impersonal 
Pragmatists believe that people know a 
great deal more than they realise, and 
so it pays to converse with them, 
rather than wait for them to tell what 
they know.  People can also say more 
than they can write, because tone and 
gesture can aid expression. Pragmatists 
try out their ideas in conversation with 
other people, provoking others into 
revealing what they think. This helps 
them to arrive at a decision quickly. 
Proceduralists believe that written 
communication is superior to the 
spoken word because it is more 
precise. There is less scope for 
ambiguity, and reason is unlikely to be 
clouded by emotion. Proceduralists 
prefer to consult through memoranda, 
which they study carefully before 
arriving at their decision.  
Complex arguments benefit from being 
set out formally, but simple powerful 
ideas can often be expressed most 
vividly in conversation. Highly original 
ideas are difficult to articulate in a 
formal way. Original solutions to 
problems are therefore more likely to 




A principled person believes that they 
are under moral obligation to a higher 
authority. They are called to play a 
particular role in society. They can 
only achieve peace of mind by doing 
their duty. Their higher nature 
(conscience, or spirit) recognises that 
they need to control their lower nature 
(body, or passions). Self-control can 
be exercised through positive 
emotions, e.g. enthusiasm for a cause, 
or negative emotions, such as guilt and 
shame. Principles need to be based on 
functionally useful moral values: 
honesty, loyalty, hard work, and so on. 
These support teamwork on projects, 
and facilitate coordination between 
different teams. An unprincipled 
person believes in satiating their 
biological needs. The only source of 
authority is their body; their objective 
is pleasure rather than peace of mind. 
People need to respect their bodily 
requirements for physical survival, but 
over-indulgence can damage health. 
People have emotional as well as 
material needs, and those who realise 
this will be happier than those who do 
not. A moral framework enhances 
emotional rewards derived from 
participation in socially beneficial 
projects. Traditional moral principles, 
such as honesty, loyalty and hard work, 
facilitate coordination in complex 
economies by reducing transaction 
costs, encouraging investment, and 
promoting hard work. An effective 
leader will therefore promote 
traditional moral principles, even if his 
ambitions are purely materialistic.   52
Secular / 
Religious 
The secular moralist expects to derive 
emotional benefits as part of an 
enhanced quality of life, whereas the 
religious person expects a dividend in 
the after-life. Religious people are 
therefore motivated by deferred rather 
than immediate emotional rewards. 
Their moral conduct is therefore more 
robust to disappointments. On the 
other hand, their beliefs in the after-
life can prove vulnerable to attack 
from sceptics. 
Rivalry between religious groups can 
promote distrust as well as trust. 
Religious commitment can make 
religious conflict very intense. On the 
other hand, religious commitment can 
also promote extreme forms of self-
sacrifice and heroism, such as those 
involved in fighting in defence of a 
country. While both secular morality 
and religious belief can generate 
emotional satisfactions (for people of 
good conduct), religion adds a further 
dimension to motivation which 
secularism lacks. 
   53
Table 7 
 





Commentary  High-performance mix 
Selfish/ 
Altruistic 
Selfish people cannot empathise with 
others. Their concerns are focused on their 
own consumption, work and leisure. They 
may be concerned with status, but only in 
an instrumental way—as a means of 
gaining privileged access to resources. 
They are concerned with the state of 
society only in so far as it impacts on their 
own material interests. Altruistic people 
empathise with others—either personally, 
e.g. friends—or impersonally, e.g. concern 
for the poor. They can derive vicarious 
pleasure from other people’s happiness, 
and share their suffering too. Degrees of 
altruism differ depending on the weight 
that people place on other people’s 
interests. 
Altruism is important in 
channelling high-tension people 
into providing support for others. 
Self-interested ambition can 
stimulate high-tension but 
generates external diseconomies, 
and leads to under-provision of 
emotional support. It does nothing 
to address the income inequality 
generated by competition between 
self-interested people, or to 
support the losers, and their 




When other people are selfish, and cannot 
be trusted, their opinions will reflect 
where their own interests lie. Consultation 
creates a risk of distorting decisions 
through lobbying from vested interests. If 
you cannot believe what other people say, 
there is no point in asking their opinion. If 
other people are honest, and their 
preferences are aligned with those of the 
decision-maker, their opinions may be 
valuable since they are likely to have been 
thinking about similar issues for 
themselves. Hence consultation is 
worthwhile. 
Consultation is useful not only in 
improving a decision but in 
motivating people to implement a 
decision through participation in 
the decision process. Opinions 
received need to be critically 
examined, however. Where 
vested interests are important, 
conflicting opinions from the 
different interests will reveal that 
a problem exists.   54
Aggressive/ 
Orderly 
People naturally respond aggressively 
when they feel frustrated or threatened. 
Unanticipated conflicts in congested 
public spaces often provoke displays of 
aggression. A low-trust society sees 
aggression as natural, and may rationalise 
reprisals as a useful form of deterrence. 
Aggression is also believed to be useful 
in strengthening competition. It 
discourages collusion and stimulates 
competitive entry into profitable 
industries. A high-trust society believes 
that aggression destroys harmony. 
Provocations often stem from 
misunderstandings. Disputes should be 
resolved, not through hasty reprisals, but 
in a more considered way through 
intermediaries such as law courts. People 
must avoid reprisals by exercising self-
control. A high- trust society believes in 
orderly competition, conducted according 
to ‘rules of the game’, which maximise 
benefits, such as innovation, and reduce 
costs from, e.g. dishonest advertising. 
The high-trust view is correct. 
An advanced society is highly 
complex, and the ‘law of the 
jungle’, which usually rewards 
aggression, does not work well. 
Reprisals can lead to feuds which 
originate with a simple 
misunderstanding. 
 
Competition is not just about 
challenging monopoly, but about 
stimulating and diffusing socially 
useful innovations. Competitors  
who sabotage each other’s 
activities do not benefit society, 
and so ‘rules of the game’ are 
required. Competition works best 
when rivals can be trusted to 
abide by the rules. 
 
While aggression may sometimes 
motivate innovation, other 
motivators, such as public 
recognition, are available too. 
Channelling aggression into 
competition may be a useful way 
of controlling a potentially 
disruptive biological urge, but it 
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Commentary  High-performance mix 
Aspirational / 
Complacent 
Aspirational people have high norms. 
These norms may correspond to ideals 
deduced from moral or theoretical 
principles. Alternatively, people with 
wide horizons may know that higher 
standards are being achieved elsewhere. 
They are dissatisfied with the status quo. 
They believe that it can and must be 
changed. Complacent people have low 
norms. They have narrow horizons due to 
a parochial outlook. They are satisfied 
with the status quo, and their chief 
ambition is to maintain it.  
The high norms of the 
aspirational person are 




A deliberative person concentrates 
single-mindedly on achieving his 
objective. He remains focused on it until 
he has either achieved it, or has 
irretrievably failed. Success is quietly 
satisfying, but failure is mortifying. A 
spontaneous person focuses on whatever 
has caught his attention most recently. It 
is not necessary to finish one task before 
starting another. Success is a cause for 
celebration, however minor it may be. 
Failure is attributed to bad lack, or 
blamed on others. 
Deliberation prevents people 
with high norms from giving up 
too easily. Spontaneity 
undermines the value of 
aspirations, since the aspirations 
are merely fantasies.   56
Optimistic / 
Pessimistic 
An optimist believes that the 
environment is favourable for the 
successful completion of a project, 
whereas a pessimist believes that it is 
unfavourable. An optimistic culture 
promotes general optimism through 
notions such as ‘the time is right’, and 
‘it’s all up for grabs.’ A pessimistic 
culture promotes the idea that if 
something was really a good idea then 
someone else would already have done it. 
Optimism reduces perceived 
risks and thereby encourages 
investment and innovation. 
However, unwarranted optimism 
can lead to wasteful projects 
being undertaken. Where the 
private benefits of investment are 
less than its public benefits, 
optimism may induce investors 
to risk losses for the public good. 
If private and social benefits are 
aligned, realism is better than 
either optimism or pessimism, as 




When an optimist is confronted by a 
group of pessimists they may decide that 
they must be wrong. They need self-
confidence to believe that they can be 
right when everyone else is wrong. A 
confident culture sustains the idea that 
people in the group are always right, at 
least compared with people in other 
groups. It may be based on a notion of 
innate superiority. People who are unsure 
usually adapt their opinions to conform 
with the majority view. 
Most leaders require self-
confidence to take the initiative 
in setting up groups, and take the 
responsibility if things should go 
wrong. A combination of 
optimism and self-confidence is 




Progressives regard change as largely 
benign. They believe it provides 
opportunities rather than threats, whereas 
conservatives take the opposite view. 
Progressives are continually raising their 
norms in line with new possibilities, 
whereas conservatives are more 
concerning with ensuring that existing 
norms are maintained. Being progressive 
involves innovation rather than 
conservation. Both are demanding, but 
innovation tends to be more demanding 
because the element of novelty increases 
the risks. 
A high-performance culture 
requires a combination of 
science-driven innovation with 
the maintenance of functionally 
useful traditional morals. It 
therefore requires both a 
progressive technical agenda and 
a conservative moral agenda. 
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